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I. Introduction 
On August 2, 1990, the whole world witnessed an unprecedented event 
in modern history, the unprovoked invasion of Kuwait by Iraqi armed 
forces. The invasion itself was historic in the sense that in this day and 
age it was still possible for one militarily powerful Asian Arab State to 
invade and overrun its relatively weaker sister State and to proceed to 
declare its annexation without fear of adverse reactions from the 
international community. That the Iraqi leaders miscalculated United 
States reactions and subsequent world-wide repercussions no one could 
today gainsay. Nor indeed could anybody deny Iraq's overestimation of 
* In its original version, this study was a paper presented by the author at 
the First Fulbright Symposium on "Challenges for the World Legal Order: The 
First Decade of the Twentieth Century", Panel II: Collective Peace-Keeping, a 
Chance for International Peace and Humanity. The paper was entitled 
"Multinational Peace-Keeping Operations: Past, Present and Future and the 
Process of Peace-Making", April 9, 1991, at Golden Gate University School of 
Law, San Francisco. 
''* B. A. Hons., M. A., B. C. L., D. Phil., D. C. L. (Oxford); Docteur en 
Droit (Paris); LL. M. (Harvard); Visiting of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-
Law (United Kingdom); Distinguished Professor of International and 
Comparative Law (Golden Gate University School of Law); Former Member 
and Special Rapporteur of the International Law Commission; Former 
Fulbright Professor of International Law and World Affairs; Member of the 
lnstitut de Droit International; Member of the Panels of Arbitrators and of 
Conciliators of ICSID (World Bank); Corresponding Collaborator of 
UNIDROIT. 
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its own military might. But what actually transpired went well beyond 
Iraq's nightmare. The series of continuing counter-measures in the form 
of corrective, punitive and remedial sanctions, adopted by the Security 
Council of the United Nations from the earliest stage of hostilities until 
today could not have been foreseen by any nation, Iraq included. 
In attempting an analytical exploration of the legal aspects the 
operations taken under the authority of the Security Council and the 
inevitable peace-making process, it would appear highly practical and 
useful to take into account the resurgence in this "Decade of 
International Law" 1 of a new "International Legal Order" curiously 
resembling the new "World Legal Order" as envisaged by the framers 
of the San Francisco Charter in 1945, whose dreams were shared by 
many. We have come a long way since. 
The preceding decade of the eighties had witnessed a paradoxical 
transition, a change or rather exchange of positions and attitudes 
between the West and the Socialist countries. As the latter began to 
show greater respect for and reliance on the United Nations 2 with the 
overwhelming support from the so-called third world or the Group of 
77 and the non-aligned nations, the West, most of all the United States 
and its closest Western allies, appear to have grown more disenchanted 
with, if not altogether disillusioned by, the stand taken by some 
Specialized Agencies of the United Nations as well as the World 
Organization itselP. 
II. Multi-national Military Operations Past, Present and Future 
A. World War II (1939-1945) 
Before embarking on the study of the United Nations experience in 
collective peace-keeping, it is useful to catch a glimpse of an earlier 
1 See General Assembly Resolution 44/23 of November 17, 1989, moved by 
the non-aligned countries following the initiative taken by their foreign 
ministers at the Conference in The Hague on June 26-29, 1989. See also 
United Nations Decade of International Law, Report of the Secretary-General, 
U.N.Doc. A/45/430 (1990); and two addenda U.N. Doc. A/45/430/Add. 1 
(1990), and Add. 2 (1990). 
2 This change of attitude on the part of China and the Soviet Union 
coincided with a transitional period not only in the field of economic theories 
but more so in their increasing respect for and reliance on international 
organizations such as the United Nations and its specialized agencies. 
3 This culminated in the U.S. withdrawal from UNESCO followed by the 
United Kingdom and Singapore. Parallel reactions occurred in other agencies 
such as ILO and FAO. The United States under the Reagan Administration 
threatened to suspend contribution to the United Nations and remained isolated 
in the world-wide endeavours to retain the United States within the framework 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
.• 
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coalition endeavour which gave birth to the United Nations and to the 
signing of the Great San Francisco Charter in 1945. 
The latest attempt to unify Europe by force was undertaken by no 
lesser Power than the Third Reich under the now admittedly insane and 
inhumane Fuhrer Hitler with his supporting Axis in Southern Europe 
under 11 Duce Mussolini and the militarist Empire of Japan under Prime 
Minister Tojo. Apart from European Unification, the Asian flank of the 
Axis also planned to establish its hegemony under the guise of "CO-
PROSPERITY SPHERE", under which Japan was to enjoy the 
dominant position in the areas overlapping the zones of influence of 
the United States, the United Kingdom, the U.S.S.R., China, France, the 
Nether lands and Portugal. Opposing domination and aggression by the 
Axis Powers were the Allied Forces, led originally by the United 
Kingdom and the Commonwealth of Nations including Canada, 
Australia and New Zealand, China, France and the U.S.S.R. and 
ultimately since Pearl Harbor by the United States and her Allies in the 
Pacific Rim. 
The Allies constituted themselves as the United Nations. Hence, the 
Charter contains reference to former enemies of the United Nations, 
now long forgotten. They included Germany, Italy and Japan. 
B. The United Nations Charter (1945) 
As originally conceived, the United Nations as the World Organization 
was to have as one of its principal organs a Security Council, 
empowered to impose sanctions and to secure and restore peace by 
whatever means necessary for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. Having learned from the bitter experience and repeated 
failures of the League of Nations, an organization devoid of 
enforcement machinery, the members of the United Nations were 
determined to add an effective and meaningful Chapter to the Charter 
of the United Nations, namely, Chapter VII. 
This Chapter contains provisions from Articles 39 to 51 
contemplating actions with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of 
the peace and acts of aggression. It is the primary responsibility of the 
Security Council to maintain international peace and security, in 
particular to determine the existence of any act of aggression, to make 
recommendations or to decide what measures to be taken to restore and 
maintain international peace and security in accordance with Articles 41 
and 42. Article 41 covers measures including "complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication, and the 
severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 further permits the taking 
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of such action by sea, air or land forces as may be necessary to maintain 
or restore international peace and security" should the Security Council 
consider measures under Article 41 inadequate. Actions under Article 
42 may include "demonstrations, blockade and other operation by air, 
sea or land forces of Members of the United Nations". 
In the practice of the United Nations, sanctions and actions 
envisaged in Chapter VII of the Charter have rarely been used due to an 
inherent defect contained in Article 27 of the Charter requiring 
decisions of the Security Council on non-procedural matters to be made 
by an affirmative vote of nine members including the concurring votes 
of the permanent members. Even with a strict interpretation adopted in 
the subsequent practice of the Security Council treating the expression 
"concurring votes" as "non-negative votes" which include abstension 
or possible absence or non-participation as opposed to a "veto" or 
"negative votes", the use of air, sea and land forces has only been 
authorized once in the Korean Conflict in 1950 owing to the absence of 
the Soviet delegate boycotting the Council for not seating the 
representative of the People's Republic of China. Subsequent action 
needed to be approved through an anomalous procedure of "Uniting 
for Peace Resolution" 4• 
Other sanctions as envisaged in Article 41 have only been applied 
against South Africa and in respect of the purported setting up of a 
Government in Rhodesia by the Ian Smith regime in 19655• 
C. Operation Desert Storm 
1. Self-Defence or Action under Chapter VII 
A practical question raised in the discussions by commentators on the 
measures taken by multi-national coalition forces was whether the 
measures authorized by the Security Council precluded the exercise of 
individual or collective self-defence by Kuwait. Different views can be 
found regarding the pre-emptive role of the Security Council seized of 
an item on its agenda as a threat or breach of the peace or the 
determination of an act of aggression6• The language of Article 51 is 
4 See Resolution of July 7, 1950, on Korean Conflict, authorizing State 
members of the United Nations to facilitate military assistance to accomplish the 
objectives of Security Council Resolution. 
5 See Resolution 217/65 of November 20, 1965, Resolution 232/66 of 
December 16, 1966, and Resolutions 213/68, 277/70, 418/77 and 421/77 and 
commentary by Diez de Velasco, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional 
Publico, Torno II, Organizaciones Internacionales, septima edicion 1990, 
pp. 140-157. 
6 See, e. g., Agora: The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations 
Law: U.N. Police Action in Lieu of War "The Old Order Changeth", 
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crystal clear: "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs 
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security". 
In the Gulf Crisis, the Security Council was apprised of the 
situation from the very start. It adopted its first Resolution on August 2, 
1990, Resolution 660 (1990), acting under Articles 39 and 40, 
condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, demanding Iraq to 
withdraw all its forces, calling upon Iraq and Kuwait to begin 
intensive negotiations, and deciding to meet again as necessary to 
consider further steps to ensure compliance with the present resolution. 
In the second resolution, Resolution 661 (1990) on August 6, 1990, 
the Security Council was more specific in its operative paragraphs. 
"The Security Council ... 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
1. Determines that Iraq so far has failed to comply with paragraph 2 
of Resolution 660 (1990) and has usurped the authority of the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait; 
2. Decides, as a consequence, to take the following measures to 
secure compliance of Iraq with paragraph 2 of Resolution 660 (1990) 
and to restore the authority of the legitimate Government of Kuwait; 
3. Decides that all States shall prevent: ... 
6. Decides to establish; in accordance with rule 28 of the provisional 
rules of procedure of the Security Council, a Committee of the Security 
Council consisting of all the members of the Council, to undertake the 
following tasks and to report on its work to the Council with its 
observations and recommendations: ... 
9. Decides that, notwithstanding paragraphs 4 through 8 above, 
nothing in the present resolution shall prohibit assistance to the 
legitimate Government of Kuwait, and calls upon all States: 
.(a) To take appropriate measures to protect assets of the legitimate 
Government of Kuwait and its agencies; 
(l:i) Not to recognize any regime set up by the occupying Power. 
In its penultimate preambular paragraph, Resolution 660 (1990) 
expressly affirms "the inherent right of individual or collective self-
Franck & Patel, 85 A.J.I.L. (1991 ), p. 63, and "Until What? Enforcement Action 
or Collective Self Defense?", Weston, 85 A.J.I.L. (1991), p. 506. 
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defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against Kuwait in 
accordance with Article 51 of the Charter". 
The inherent right of self-defence, individual as well as collective, is 
thus distinctly reserved and preserved by Security Council Resolution 
660 (1990). 
However, "measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security" were not yet taken by the Security Council until ten or eleven 
resolutions later. 
In Resolution 662 (1990) on August 9, 1990, the Security Council 
gravely alarmed by the Declaration by Iraq of a "comprehensive and 
eternal merger with Kuwait, decides that the annexation of Kuwait by 
Iraq under any form and whatever pretext has no legal validity, and is 
considered null and void, and inter alia, calls upon all States, 
international organizations and specialized agencies not to recognize 
that annexation . . . " This was reaffirmed in operative paragraph 3 of 
Resolution 664 (1990) on August 18, 1990. 
Subsequently, Resolutions 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674 and 677 
were all adopted by the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of 
the Charter. 
It was not until Resolution 678 (1990) on November 29, 1990, that, 
again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Security Council 
authorized member States cooperating with the Government of Kuwait, 
to use all necessary means including the use of force to uphold and 
implement Resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolu-
tions and to restore international peace and security in the area". The 
use of all necessary means is authorized "unless Iraq on or before 15 
January 1991 fully implements ... the foregoing resolutions", i. e., 
Resolutions 660-667. 
In fact, no such measures were taken until 45 days after Security 
Council Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 was adopted, i.e., until 
the day after January 15, 1991 being the ultimate deadline imposed by 
the Security Council. It is still very difficult to determine with absolute 
precision the date at which "measures" were in fact taken by the 
Security Council "necessary to maintain international peace and 
security". Was it January 16, 1991 or rather March 2, 1991, upon the 
suspension of combat operations, marking the end of "Operation 
Desert Storm" when it could really be said that the Security Council 
had not only authorized certain measures to be taken by January 16, 
1991, but also the measures thus authorized were successfully taken to 
restore and maintain international peace and security? Depending on 
the interpretation and determination of the date at which international 
peace and security could be considered restored and maintained, until 
such date the inherent right of individual and collective self defence 
, 
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must continue to be exercisable. The right is by no means "dormant" 7• 
It was emphatically reaffirmed from the outset. 
But clearly the inherent right of self-defence in any particular 
instance may continue to exist only until such time as it becomes too 
late to exercise. Just as "restitution stops where repayment begins". The 
"Operation Desert Shield" must stop where "Operation Desert Storm" 
begins. If "Desert Shield" was an exercise of collective self-defence, it 
was designed for the defence of Saudi Arabia and not Kuwait. Measures 
designed to "retake" or "restore sovereignty of Kuwait" were reflected 
in "Operation Desert Storm", distinguishable from the exercise of any 
inherent right of self-defence. 
In point of fact, Kuwait's inherent right of individual and collective 
self-defence existed when the armed attack by Iraq occurred on August 
2, 1990, but that right did not survive the complete take-over of Kuwait 
by Iraq. Kuwait had to rely on the United Nations Security Council 
measures under Chapter VII not only for its self-defence but more 
essentially for the restoration of its sovereignty and the return and 
maintenance of international peace and security. 
It should be recalled that "Operation Desert Storm" was preceded 
by "Operation Desert Shield", undertaken initially as a defence 
mechanism to contain further aggression by Iraq against Saudi Arabia 
and yonder, and not as an effort to retake Kuwait. It was not until 
Resolution 678 of November 29, 1990 that the possibility and prospect 
of "retaking of Kuwait" became imminent upon repeated Iraqi refusals 
to withdraw from Kuwait. At that moment when the ultimatum 
imposed by the Security Council expired, operation "Desert Shield" 
could be transformed into operation "Desert Storm". 
Without entering too deeply into the controversy whether the 
execution of operation "Desert Storm" by the coalition forces of 29 
nations was an exercise of the inherent right of collective self-defence 
which has been preserved unimpaired by Article 51 of the Charter or 
rather an operation pursuant to Security Council Resolution 678 (1990) 
on November 29, 1990, the following opinion may be ventured. 
There appears to be no apparent necessity to preclude the right of 
self-defence from any action authorized by the Security Council acting 
under Chapter VII of the Charter. In point of fact, Article 51 is placed 
7 See, e. g., M ullerson 's statement at a 1990 Conference on International 
Law and the Non-Use of Force, convened jointly by the American Society of 
International Law and the Soviet Association of International Law, Washington, 
D.C. (October 4-6, 1990). For Secretary-General's comments, see, Washington 
Post, November 9, 1990, at A. 30, Col. 5. See also Franck & Patel, 85 AJIL 
(1991) at 63, 64. See also Dinstein, War, Aggression and Self-Defence, pp. 142-
143 (1988). 
8 S. Sucharitkul 
at the end of Chapter VII precisely to preserve unimpaired the inherent 
right of individual or collective self-defence. To say that the right of 
self-defence is dormant once the Security Council is seized of the 
situation is not to say that it is not exercisable. The truth is that the 
Security Council can affirm and has in fact repeatedly reaffirmed the 
possibility of self-defence for as long as the need and the opportunity 
continue to exist. 
It is at this juncture that a quick glance may be taken at the right of 
self-defence, individual and collective. Whichever the case, it cannot be 
taken outside the perview of Chapter VII or unreported to the Security 
Council. It is clear that it remains unimpaired "until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace 
and security". There are thus two crucial questions to be answered. 
First is the question of the time at which it could be said that the 
Security Council "has taken measures necessary to maintain internatio-
nal peace and security". Secondly, once that moment materializes, how 
and to what extent is the inherent right of self-defence, individual and 
collective, impaired. Is it temporarily suspended? Or is it no longer 
exercisable? 
Let us take as a starting point the notion of self-defence in the 
practice of States before the advent of the United Nations. It is not 
uncommon to hear greater cry for self-defence from a bigger and more 
resourceful military power, both in time and in the scope and extent of 
its exercise. On the other hand, it is not unusual for a less powerful 
nation to be more conservative and restrictive in regard to the scope, 
extent as well as duration. Thus, in a classic case concerning The 
Caroline in 18388, Mr. Webster on behalf of the United States wrote to 
Mr. Fox of the United Kingdom in a dispute relating to the necessity of 
self -defence: 
"It will be for ... [Her Majesty's] Government to show a necessity 
of self-defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means and, 
no moment of deliberation. It will be for it to show, also that the local 
authorities of Canada, even supposing the necessity of the moment 
authorized them to enter the territories of the United States at all, did 
nothing unreasonable and excessive; since the act, justified by the 
necessity of self-defence, must be limited by that necessity, and kept 
clearly within it ... A necessity for all this, the Government of the 
United States cannot believe to have existed"9• 
Lord Ashburton replied to Mr. Webster's note in 1842, expressing 
satisfaction "to perceive that we are perfectly agreed as to the general 
8 29 BFSP 1137-1138, 30 BFSP 195-196. 
9 April24, 1841, in 29 BFSP 1137-1138; see jennings in 32 AJIL 82 (1938). 
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principles of international law applicable to this unfortunate case. 
Respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent 
nations is the most essential foundation of civilization" 10• 
A report made to the League of Nations in 1927 confirmed the 
principle of proportionality in the exercise of legitimate defence. Only 
measures proportionate to the seriousness of the attack and justified by 
the seriousness of the danger may be adopted 11 • 
As Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter prohibits the use of force 
without impairing the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 of 
the Charter, attempts have been made on the part of stronger States to 
expand the notion of self-defence. To cite but a few examples, the 
quarantine imposed by the United States during the Missiles Crisis of 
1962 was partially based on the necessity of self-defence 12• The abortive 
rescue attempts pending the proceedings in the Hostages Case between 
the United States and Iran (April 24-25, 1980) were inspired by 
humanitarian considerations and claimed by the United States to be in 
exercise of its inherent right of self-defence. So were also the military 
and para-military activities conducted by the United States in and 
against Nicaragua. In neither case could the International Court find its 
way to treating the use of force by the United States as an exercise of the 
inherent right of self-defence, individual or collective 13• 
The question under review in the Gulf Crisis is not whether Kuwait 
had the inherent right to self-defence when the armed attack occurred 
on August 2, 1990. This was clearly confirmed by the Security Council 
in Resolution 660 (1990). Nor was there any doubt regarding the 
legitimacy of measures taken by States in response to the various 
Security Council Resolutions whether as sanctions to induce 
compliance by Iraq or as enforcement measures including the use of 
force authorized by the Security Council, acting under Chapter VII 
(Articles 41 and 42) to restore and maintain international peace and 
security. 
10 July 28, 1842, 30 BFSP 195-196, Lord Ashburton made an effort to 
justify the British action in accordance with the test formulated by Mr. Webster, 
which has commonly been accepted as indicating the circumstances precluding 
wrongfulness in the exercise of self-defence. 
11 L. o. N. Doc. A. 14, 1927. V. V. Legal 1927, V. 14, pp. 60-69. 
12 Dean Acheson thought every nation had the right to survive and that 
survival of States is not a matter of law. Dean Acheson, 57 ASIL Proc. 14 (1963). 
13 While the rescue attempts were close to self-help which the Court did not 
take so kindly as they tended "to undermine" respect for the judicial process in 
international relations while the activities against Nicaragua were held to be 
unlawful intervention and not justified by any necessity of collective self-
defence. See ICJ Reports 1980, Judgement of May 24, 1980, paras 32 and 93-94, 
and ibid., 1986, Judgement of June 27, 1986, para 293 (2). 
'• 
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The question that may still be validly asked is whether the action 
taken by the Security Council or measures taken by States in response 
to its resolutions by way of sanction, prevention or enforcement 
necessarily preclude the exercise of self-defence, individual or collective. 
The answer is clearly in the negative. The two notions or actions are not 
mutually exclusive. They are never intended to be mutually exclusive. 
In fact, measures taken with the authorization of the Security Council 
under Chapter VII could overlap or overshadow all measures of self-
defence, individual or collective. 
It was apparent on the other hand that after Iraq's declared merger 
with Kuwait, the exercise of Kuwait's inherent right of individual self-
defence was almost irretrievably lost. The deposed Kuwaiti Gover-
nment had no possibility of defending itself single-handed. Collective 
self-defence was still conceivable if actions were taken under the League 
of Arab States. 
A question may be raised as to the duration of the lapse of time 
needed for the waning right of self-defence to be revived. The sooner 
sovereignty is restored to the victim of aggression, the earlier the revival 
of the inherent right of self-defence in actual fact. It is useful to note, 
however, that in point of law, the Security Council has declared the 
purported annexation of Kuwait by Iraq to be null and void, thereby 
preventing the lapse of time or extinctive prescription from running 
against the rights and interests of Kuwait to recover its sovereignty. 
Once the Security Council has decided to adopt measures 
effectively to restore and maintain the peace and security in Kuwait, 
the possibility of Kuwait exercising its inherent right of self-defence has 
become academic, whether individual or collective, within or without 
the United Nations. In any event, self-defence has been well 
overreached if not overtaken by United Nations action authorized 
under Chapter VII. 
2. The Borderline between Self-Defence and Counter-Measures 
The second question that has been raised in connection with operation 
"Desert Storm" is whether the operation is to be considered as an 
independent exercise of collective self-defence or as forming part and 
parcel of the series of counter-measures taken by States and 
international organizations, including the multi-national coalition 
forces against Iraq. 
Among the sanctions in the form of counter-measures authorized 
by Security Council resolutions against Iraq may be mentioned, the 
deployment of maritime forces and the use of such measures 
commensurate to the specific circumstances to halt all inward and 
I 
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outward maritime shipping (Resolution 665), the placement of an 
embargo on import and export to and from Iraq or Kuwait by air or by 
sea (Resolution 670) and ultimately the use of all necessary means to 
restore and maintain international peace and security (Resolution 678). 
Counter-measures and self-defence are both relevant as distinct sets 
of circumstances precluding wrongfulness. They are distinguishable in 
more than one respects. Counter-measures in the form of punitive, 
preventive or enforcement measures may be applicable as consequences 
of an internationally wrongful act and not simply as circumstances 
precluding wrongfulness. Thus, the International Law Commission 
considers legitimate counter-measure against a State which has 
committed an internationally wrongful act under Article 30 of the 
draft articles on State Responsibility14• This may include different types 
of reaction to an internationally wrongful act, such as retorsion, reprisal 
and other forms of retaliation which could be compensatory, remedial 
or even punitive in nature and can be viewed as sanctions or 
enforcement measures. 
On the other hand, Article 34 provides in the same context that a 
lawful measure of self-defence taken in conformity with the Charter of 
the United Nations equally precludes the wrongfulness of an act of a 
State not in conformity with an international obligation of that State. 
Admittedly, a State acting in self-defence acts in response to an 
imminent danger or peril, which, not unlike the case of state of 
necessity, must be serious, immediate and incapable of being countered 
by other means. It is doubtful whether operation "Desert Storm" was 
undertaken "without any choice of means or any moment of 
deliberation". Furthermore, self-defence and counter-measures (sanc-
tions or enforcement measures) are reactions which relate to different 
points in time and above all are logically distinct. Action in self-defence 
is action taken by a State to defend its territorial integrity or its 
independence against violent attack. It is action whereby "defensive" 
means are used to resist an "offensive" use of armed force, with the 
object of preventing another wrongful action from proceeding and 
achieving its purpose. Action taking the form of a sanction or counter-
measure on the other hand consists in the application ex post facto, to a 
State committing a wrongful act of one of the possible consequences 
that international law attaches to the commission of such an act. In 
other words, self-defence is a reaction to the commission of a specific 
kind of internationally wrongful act such as an armed attack, whereas 
counter-measures, including sanctions and even reprisals are reactions 
14 See commentary in Yearbook of the ILC 1979, Vol. II (Part Two), 
pp. 115-122. 
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that fall within the context of the operation of the consequences of the 
internationally wrongful act in terms of international responsibility. 
Nowadays, however, only sanctions referred to in Chapter VII of the 
Charter can entail a lawful use of force 15• 
As for operation "Desert Storm", inasmuch as it was well within the 
measures authorized by Resolution 678 (1990), the question is more 
purely academic whether the use of force by the coalition forces in 
response to Iraqi armed attack exceeded the limits of self-defence in 
scope or in time, or the rule of proportionality. They are nonetheless 
sanctions authorized by the United Nations to restore peace and 
security in the area. Since operation "Desert Storm" involved the use of 
force, it can only be justified either as an act of self-defence or as lawful 
counter-measures. It would serve no useful purpose to determine 
whether such legitimate measures were exclusively collective self-
defence which could have been taken outside the framework of the 
United Nations, while in the actual occurrence, they were specifically 
authorized as sanction by the United Nations to ensure compliance of 
its resolutions by Iraq. 
D. The Future of Multi-National Coalition in Support of United 
Nations Sanctions 
A more fundamental and general challenge relates to the future role of 
multi-national coalition of the unprecedented kind against Iraqi 
aggression contributed by no fewer than 29 nations including Kuwait 
and authorized by a principal political organ of the United Nations. A 
practical lesson may be learned from the steps taken in the discharge of 
the primary responsibility of the Security Council which could be 
followed in future cases of aggression. Assurances should be given that 
in future peace will be kept by resorting to the same procedure for the 
peace-restoring operation authorized by the Security Council. The facts 
of the Iraqi aggression are not likely to be repeated in future events 
involving another oil rich country attacked by another neighbouring 
State. The question is whether the positive elements within the Security 
Council will continue to be present to pre-empt the recurrence of future 
acts of aggression. The United States would in all likelihood be 
prepared to come to the rescue of a country like Grenada if attacked by 
another country like Cuba. But would the same answer be given if an 
invasion occurred outside its traditional spheres of influence, say in 
Eastern Europe? It is difficult to predict in advance how nations will 
behave or react in like circumstances. Furthermore, other key roles are 
15 See Commentary to Article 34: Self-Defence, in Yearbook of ILC 1980, 
Vol. II (Part Two), pp. 52-61. 
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played by all the other permanent members of the Security Council. If 
only one of them said no to any proposal or any draft Resolution, the 
whole coalition would be aborted or still-born. China could veto such a 
move. The Soviet Union would have vetoed such a coalition, had the 
event occurred prior to the adoption of Perestroika and Glasnost, and 
before the Soviet Enlightenment. At least, we have the coincidence of 
these occurrences to be thankful for in the current situation. The 
question remains whether these changes of attitude, and changes of 
heart, are here to stay. Can we depend on the whims of the leaders and 
on the winds and currents of international politics? 
The so-called New World Legal Order is not at all new. It is but a 
recent show of its inner character of its true self, as we created it in 1945. 
Only we have become more true to the commitments and to the goals 
to which we had earlier pledged ourselves. The future really depends on 
our continued sincerity and determination to uphold the Rule of Law 
irrespective of short-term national interests. The Rule of Law must be 
resuscitated and further reinforced by the jus cogens principle of non-
use of force. The use of force is forever illicit except for individual or 
collective self-defence against an armed attack. Unfortunately, superior 
force can only be repelled by the legitimate, deliberate, measured and 
collective use of multi-national forces which in the event of a complete 
take-over could only be authorized by the Security Council, as the 
primarily responsible organ of the World Legal Order. Operation 
"Desert Storm" is a classic example of legitimate, limited and 
proportionate use of force authorized by the Security Council in 
conformity with the Charter as a counter-measure to undo the 
consequences of an act of aggression and to redeem the sovereign 
rights of an independent nation when self-defence, individual or 
collective has been of no avail. 
This is by no means an endorsement of the equation of the current 
World Legal Order with the "partnership" between "the Rule of Law" 
and "the Responsible Application of Force" 16• It should be emphasized 
that under contemporary international law, there is no room for the use 
of force by States except in self-defence or as authorized by the United 
Nations. The notion of "responsible application of force" will open the 
door to endless abuses by providing an unwarranted excuse for resort 
to the use of force otherwise absolutely prohibited by law. It is not 
16 See, e. g., Ambassador Thomas Pickering's statement in the Security 
Council on March 2, 1991. President Bush is reported to have referred to the 
"New World Order" where there is the right of everyone to say "No" to 
aggression, and enforceability is reflected in the power to enforce the Rule of 
Law. 
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enough that force is applied responsibly. The application of force is not 
at all possible without prior authorization, and even when authorized it 
has to be applied responsibly. 
III. The Process of Peace-Making 
The present is still vivid in the mind of the world, thanks to the 
exposure of modern techniques in telecommunication and the complete 
coverage given by news media of the combat operations of the coalition 
forces conducted by the United States and 28 other nations to secure 
implementation of Resolution 660 17 and 10 other resolutions 18 as 
authorized by Resolution 678 19 of the Security Council with the 
resulting casualties of more than one hundred thousand Iraqi troops 
and civilians. The multi-national peace-keeping operation has been 
successful in its primary objectives of restoration of peace and security 
and in the return of the legitimate government of Kuwait to its 
homeland. Much remains however to be done by way of reconstruc-
tion, rehabilitation and normalization of the conditions existing prior to 
August 2, 1990. 
The environmental aspects of the ruins and remnants of the 
embattled theatre in Kuwait and the general pollution of the air and 
water throughout Kuwait and over the entire region of the Persian Gulf 
will take years and billions of dollars to recuperate. The restoration of 
environmental conditions fit for human habitation presents a real 
challenge to the scientists, hydrologists and ecologists of all times. 
It was not until April 3, 1991 that the Security Council adopted its 
fourteenth Resolution20 defining strict conditions for a permanent 
cease-fire between the Iraqi forces and the multi-national coalition 
forces authorized by its Resolution 678. It remains to be seen whether 
the measures envisaged by this longest Resolution ever will be accepted 
and implemented by Iraq. If so this would mark the termination of 
hostilities in a more permanent and formal manner21 • 
Questions of reparation and restitution of private property have yet 
to be heard, considered and resolved. The exchange of prisoners of war 
17 UNSC Resolution 660, August 2, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1323 (1990). 
18 UNSC Resolutions 661, 662, 664, 665, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677 (1990). 
Dietrich Schindler also lists 15 Security Council Resolutions in Revue suisse de 
droit international et de droit europeen, 1/1991, p. 3 at pp. 4-5. 
19 UNSC Resolution 678, November 29, 1990, 29 I.L.M. 1565 (1990); see 
also UNSC Resolution 686 of March 2, 1991. 
20 UNSC Resolution 687, April 3, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991); see also 
fifteenth Resolution of the Security Council 688, April 5, 1991. Ibid. p. 858. 
21 For further details of the conditions for permanent cease-fire set by the 
Security Council and its future implementation, see Section III, B below. 
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may have got off on the right footing. The military personnel of the 
coalition forces held by Iraq have all been released, although the return 
of civilian detainees is still being monitored. Casualties of the campaign 
have been extraordinarily light on the side of the coalition forces, except 
for the accident of a friendly fire and the fortuitous event of one scud 
missile in Saudi Arabia. In any case of casualties, death or injuries, the 
Law of State Responsibility applies to all Parties, be it Iraq or the 
unintended errors of a friendly fire. 
At present evidence is being gathered and collated to substantiate 
the various claims, private as well as governmental, as the victims of 
Iraqi acts of aggression spread far and wide throughout Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates and the countries bordering the Persian 
Gulf as well as other members of the League of Arab States, and even 
Israel in connection with resulting damage and loss of lives and 
properties following the scud missiles attacks by Iraq. 
Eventually, international claims commissions will be set up to 
consider and settle such claims. The real challenge to the world is where 
and how to retrieve the hidden resources of Iraq to satisfy the awards 
rendered. The ultimate responsibility will unfairly have to be borne by 
innocent subsequent generations of Iraqi civilians. The only comfort 
that is plausible may consist in the harsh reality of international life that 
each people has to account for the imperfections of its own government. 
The lesson to be drawn from this challenge is that there is also reverse 
vicarious liability or imputability of residual liability to the people. 
Whether or not and to whatever extent a regime may be democratic, the 
people must also answer for the acts of aggression and for the cruel and 
inhuman treatment attributable to the government they have chosen or 
tolerated. If the innocent Iraqi people have to pay for the wrongs 
committed by Iraqi officials, it is because they have been too 
complacent and have failed to perform their civic duties in choosing 
their own government and in tolerating or acquiescing in the nefarious 
activities of the despotic government. No people can escape the ultimate 
international responsibility by pleading complacency, ignorance or 
inaction. Every people ought to be active and to control the actions of 
the government. That is why the General Assembly repeatedly 
recognized the permanent sovereignty of each people over natural 
resources within national boundary. 
It does not follow that the Government, its agencies and leaders can 
escape their primary liability or their official and personal responsibi-
lities with regard to all these claims nor for that matter for the offences 
against the peace and security of mankind. International tribunals may 
be established on the models of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals to 
prosecute and adjudge the offences against international law and to 
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punish those found guilty of such offences and violations of 
international law. There can be no doubt that the State of Iraq, its 
Government and agents are officially and personally accountable for the 
various breaches of international obligations, specifically contained in 
the Vienna Conventions on Diplomatic and on Consular Relations and 
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 on the Treatment of Civilians in 
Non-National Armed Conflict, and the Treatment of Prisoners of War. 
Students of modern international law will recall that war is normally 
terminated by the conclusion of a peace treaty. War may break out by 
the start of hostilities or by a declaration of war. Before the state of war 
or the existence of an armed conflict can be said to have come to an end, 
a number of significant events may occur. 
Combat operations may stop and hostilities may terminate 
altogether. Thus, an end may be put to the shooting war by the 
adoption of a ceasefire which is a military arrangement reached between 
the opposing commanders in the field. A cease-fire which is initially 
provisional or temporary can become more permanent upon further 
negotiations and conclusion of a formal cease-fire agreement, specifying 
in greater details the conditions to be observed by the parties to the 
cease-fire. 
From the moment of cessation of hostilities as evidenced by the 
formal cease-fire agreement to the end of the state of war, there may be 
an extended period of relative peace without combat operations and 
without formal restoration of peaceful conditions or the return of peace 
as signalled by the conclusion of a treaty of peace to end the state of war 
or terminate the legal existence of an armed conflict. 
The practice of States indicates that major wars especially global 
wars have been terminated by the conclusion of a collective peace treaty 
such as the Treaty of Versailles after World War F 2 or a series of 
bilateral and multilateral peace treaties such as the Peace Treaty between 
the United States and Japan terminating the state of war between the 
two States in 1951 23 • The process of peace-making generally takes a 
long time to complete after the conclusion of a cease-fire agreement. It 
is thus an indispensable final phase of ending the state of war or the 
return to normalcy after terminating the armed conflict. 
In the current armed conflict between Iraq and Kuwait which has 
subsided since the suspension of combat operation by the coalition 
forces and the retreat and subsequent withdrawal of Iraqi troops from 
Kuwait, a more permanent cease-fire agreement is yet to be 
22 June 28, 1919, Versailles, 13 A.J.I.L. Supp. 151; 16 A.J.I.L. Supp. 207; 
UKTS 4 (1919), Command Papers 153. 
23 Peace Treaty with Japan, 1951, TIAS No. 2490, 136 UNTS. 45. 
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concluded24• The procedure adopted is unprecedented as the Security 
Council has for the first time in its 45 years' history taken the initiative 
not only to authorize by Resolution 678 the use of all measures 
required to enforce compliance with its 11 previous resolutions from 
Resolution 660 onwards, but has now proposed conditions to be 
observed by Iraq for terminating the status of the existing armed 
conflict. What appears to have created a precedent is the direct 
involvement of the Security Council in the proposal, approval and 
virtually in the negotiation of the terms and conditions for terminating 
the armed conflict initiated by Iraq. This part of the peace-making 
process is popularly known as the Cease-Fire Resolution. 
The terms and conditions of the Cease-Fire Resolution to be 
accepted and implemented by Iraq are obviously designed to restore 
peace and order and to normalize relations between Iraq and its 
neighbours. To ensure peaceful transition from the state of war to the 
state of peace, or from the status of armed conflict to that of peaceful 
coexistence and cooperation, the principles of friendly relations and 
good-neighbourliness have guided the Security Council to prescribe 
certain conditions. 
For students of International Law, the process can be seen as the 
adoption of measures to redress the wrongs committed by Iraq and to 
make sure that no such wrongs could recur in the future. Thus we are 
passing from the law regulating the use of force to the law of the State 
Responsibility. 
A. The Law of State Responsibility 
In terms of the Law of State Responsibility, the Security Council has 
clearly determined the existence of acts of aggression by Iraq in the Gulf 
Crisis and has made many recommendations regarding such matters as 
non-recognition of its annexation of Kuwait. It also imposed a 
succession of economic sanctions and blockade against Iraq. There 
are legal consequences attached to these as well as other decisions, 
determinations and recommendations of the Security Council for all 
States, international organizations and NGOs. 
24 Thus, UNSC Resolution 688 on humanitarian assistance was not yet 
accepted by Iraq as of April 18, 1991 when a Memorandum of Understanding 
was signed between the Government of Iraq and the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations following the two UN Missions, one led by Eric Suy (April13-
18, 1991) as Personal Representative of the UN Secretary-General, and the other 
UN Inter-Agency Mission led by Prince Sadruddin Aga Khan, Executive 
Delegate of the UN Secretary-General of the UN Humanitarian Programme for 
Iraq, Kuwait and the Iraq/Iran and Iraq/Turkey Border Areas (April 16-18, 
1991) 30 ILM., 860-862 (1991). 
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Iraq has been found responsible for each and all its internationally 
wrongful acts against various injured States, principally Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia and others. The Law of State Responsibility prescribes three 
steps or tiers of remedial measures. 
EX NUNC, as the first step, the State responsible for the 
internationally wrongful acts is bound to cease and desist forthwith 
from all acts found to be internationally wrongful. Thus, invasion must 
be stopped and occupying forces withdrawn from Kuwait. The 
annexation declared by Iraq must be annulled by appropriate 
legislative enactment equivalent to the proclamation of annexation 
itself. All prisoners of war and detainees including civilian hostages 
must be released and repatriated. 
EX TUNC, as the next step, the State committing the internatio-
nally wrongful act is required to make the reparation required of it by 
international law. This may be achieved by "restitutio in integrum stricto 
sensu" consisting of restitution or return of every object or property 
taken in violation of international law and restoration in full of the 
rights deprived or curtailed. For property lost or damaged and for death 
and personal injuries, where restitution is not an appropriate redress, a 
substitute obligation needs to be fulfilled by way of appropriate 
compensation. The amount of monetary compensation is assessed in 
accordance with the standard laid down by the Permanent Court of 
International Justice in the Chorzow Factory Case and should serve "to 
wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act" including pecuniary 
compensation even if it is materially impossible to wipe out the 
injurious consequences25 • Where pecuniary compensation is awarded as 
a counterpart of an irreparable loss, it might resemble a "penalty". Yet 
in many national legal systems such compensation is awarded as 
"damages" rather than as "punishment". 
EX ANTE signifies the final step in the implementation of measures 
of redress available to the injured State. Monetary compensation by the 
author State may not wholly make good the damage suffered by the 
injured State as the result of the internationally wrongful act. Some 
other satisfaction may be required, as indeed is often given by the 
author State in the form of "apologies" and "guarantees" that the author 
State will see to it that such wrongful acts will not be repeated in the 
future. Such measures of satisfaction may be regarded as examples of ex 
ante secondary obligations to be performed by the author State, 
25 In this connection, see the Second Report of Professor Willem Rip hagen, 
Special Rapporteur on the topic of State Responsibility, Document A/CN.4/ 
344, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1981, Vol. II (Part One), 
pp. 79-101. 
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involving the credibility of the primary rule itself, and not as a penalty 
to which the author State is made liable26 • 
B. Implementation of Obligations Resulting from State Responsibility 
As part and parcel of the peace-making process27, the three steps or 
three phases of measures to be undertaken by Iraq correspond to the 
right of the injured State or States to present international claims in 
respect of the wrongful acts committed by Iraq, engaging its State 
responsibility. The preceding outline of steps and measures EX NUNC, 
EX TUNC and EX ANTE appear to have been adequately taken into 
consideration by the Security Council in its debate and decision-
making, as evidenced by the adoption of the Cease-Fire Resolution of 
April 3, 1991. Without commenting on all the conditions and 
obligations to be undertaken and complied with by Iraq in the process 
of peace-making as prescribed by the longest ever Security Council 
Resolution 687 (3900 words)28, the following basic assurances, 
undertakings and acceptances on the part of Iraq need to be outlined. 
1. The First Series of Steps: EX NUNC- For immediate action apart 
from the cessation of hostilities against Kuwait and the coalition forces, 
Iraq is required to disengage its troops by completely withdrawing its 
armed forces and military equipment from Kuwait and away from the 
security zone set up by the coalition forces to ensure the security and 
safety of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. 
A separate United Nations peace-keeping force is contemplated for 
the task of overseeing completion of compliance with the Cease-Fire 
Resolution in regard to each and every step in the process of peace-
making. The tasks undertaken by the United Nations as an 
international organization are unequalled in the history of the World 
Organization. The United Nations forces which will not include troops 
from the States contributing to the multi-national coalition forces will 
26 See Preliminary Report by the same Special Rapporteur, Document A/ 
CN. 4/330, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1980, Vol. II (Part 
One), p. 113. This does not imply that there could never be an element of 
vengeance in a "satisfaction" claimed by an injured State, as may be the case 
when Israel presents her claims against Iraq for damage to property and personal 
injurr suffered as the consequence of the various Scud Missiles attacks by Iraq. 
2 The actual settlement of war claims or peace settlements could take much 
longer than the process of peace-making. The principles of peace settlement 
could be included in the peace treaties to be observed and performed long after 
actual termination of the state of war. See, e. g., Vignes, La Commission de 
Conciliation Franco-Italienne, 1955 Annuaire fran'<ais de droit international 
212. 
28 UNSC Resolution 687 (1991) of April3, 1991, 30 ILM at 847 (1991). 
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be sent to help demarcate the boundary in the troubled border area 
between Iraq and Kuwait. 
a. Boundary Demarcation and Guarantee of Inviolability of Kuwait-
Iraq Boundary 
As part of the initial steps to be taken immediately to facilitate the 
supervision of the withdrawal and exchange of prisoners of war across 
the Iraq-Kuwait boundary, it is necessary to re-establish the boundary 
line between the two countries. Thus, Part A. of the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) requires both Iraq and Kuwait 
to respect the "inviolability of the international boundary and the 
allocation of islands set out in the 'Agreed Minutes between the State of 
Kuwait and the Republic of Iraq regarding the Restoration of Friendly 
Relations, Recognition and Related Matters', signed by them in the 
exercise of their sovereignty at Baghdad on October 4, 1963"29• For this 
purpose, the United Nations Secretary-General is called upon to "lend 
his assistance to make arrangements with Iraq and Kuwait to demarcate 
the boundary between Iraq and Kuwait drawing on appropriate 
material, including the map transmitted by Security Council document 
S/22412"30• The Security Council itself guarantees the inviolability of 
this international boundary, which its demands Iraq and Kuwait to 
respect and proceeded to take necessary measure as appropriate to that 
end. 31 
b. Deployment of a United Nations Observer Unit to Monitor the 
Demilitarized Zone 
To monitor the Khor Adbullah and a demilitarized zone, extending ten 
kilometres into Iraq and five kilometres into Kuwait from the above-
mentioned international boundary to be demarcated, the Secretary-
General submitted within 3 days a plan for immediate deployment of a 
United Nations Observer Unit, to deter violation of the boundary 
through its presence in and surveillance of the demilitarized zone32• 
29 Paragraph 2 of the operative Part A. The "Agreed Minutes" were 
registered with the UN and published in Document 7063, UNTS, 1964, 
reproduced in 30 ILM 855 (1991). 
30 Paragraph 3 of the operative Part A. 
31 Dr. Mochtar Kusuma-Atmadja of Indonesia was sent to head a UN 
demarcation team. 
32 Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Part B. of the UNSC Resolution 687. The unit will 
also observe any hostile action mounted from the territory of one State to the 
other, and for the Secretary-General to report to the Council immediately if 
there are serious violations of the zone or potential threats to peace. As soon as 
deployment was completed, Member States cooperating with Kuwait would 
bring their military presence in Iraq to an end consistent with Resolution 686 
(1991). 
~ 
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c. Obligations to Cease and Desist from Acts of International 
Terrorism 
Operative Part H. of the Resolution contains a provision requiring Iraq 
to refrain from "committing or supporting" any act of international 
terrorism or allow any organization directed towards commission of 
such acts to operate within its territory and to stop and discontinue 
unequivocally all acts, methods and practices of terrorism. In this 
particular connection, Iraq is also bound over (EX ANTE) to condemn 
and renounce all such acts 33 • 
Peace-keeping operation by the independent United Nations 
Observer Unit will also serve to oversee compliance by Iraq with 
other aspects of the cease-fire agreement. In particular, Iraq must cease 
and desist from further aggravating the environmental holocaust 
attributable to its forces in the explosion of the oil wells in flame that 
continue to burn, and the oil-spills into the Persian Gulf resulting in 
considerable damage to the marine environment as well as marine life 
and other wildlife. Extinction of the fires and restoration to safe 
conditions will be conducted at the ultimate expense of Iraq as part of 
its EX TUNC obligation. 
2. The Second Series of Steps: EX TUNC- For the damage caused, 
there must be restitutio in integrum or pecuniary compensation. Iraq is 
held responsible for the death, physical injury, loss of property and 
damage, including environmental havoc resulting from her invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait. 
a. Repatriation of all Kuwaiti and third Country Nationals 
As part of "restitutio in integrum" in respect of displaced persons as a 
consequence of Iraq invasion and occupation of Kuwait, United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 687 (1991) Part G 34 imposes 
additional duties on Iraq to extend all necessary cooperation to the 
International Committee of the Red Cross, providing lists of such 
persons, facilitating the access of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to all such persons wherever located or detained and 
facilitating the search by the International Committee for those Kuwaiti 
and third country nationals still unaccounted for. The Red Cross is 
invited to keep the Secretary-General apprised of all activities 
undertaken in this regard. 
33 See Paragraph 32. 
34 See Paragraphs 30 and 31, 30 ILM 854 (1991 ). 
.• 
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b. Return of All Kuwaiti Property Seized by Iraq 
The Cease-Fire Resolution appears to have taken for granted the 
obligation to return all Kuwaiti property seized by Iraq since its 
invasion and during its occupation of Kuwaiti territory. Property seized 
by Iraq in Kuwait as well as elsewhere, must be returned to the original 
owner. 
For this purpose, Paragraph 15 35 of the Security Council Resolution 
687 (1991) requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security 
Council "on the steps taken to facilitate the return of all Kuwaiti 
property seized by Iraq, including a list of any property that Kuwait 
claims has not been returned or which has not been returned intact". 
For the latter category of property not returned intact, a separate 
treatment is provided in operative Part E. 
c. Obligation to Make Reparation for Loss, Damage and Depletion of 
Natural Resources and Other Forms of Injury 
Paragraph 16 in operative Part E of Security Council Resolution 687 
(1991) reaffirms Iraq's liability "under international law for any direct 
loss, damage, including environmental damage and the depletion of 
natural resources, or injury to foreign Governments, nationals and 
corporations as a result of Iraq's unlawful invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait" 36• This obligation to make reparation is without prejudice to 
the debts and obligations of Iraq existing or arising prior to August 2, 
1990. Repudiations by Iraq since August 2, 1990, of its foreign debt are 
declared to be null and void and Iraq is required to fulfill all of its 
obligations concerning servicing and repayment of its foreign debe7• 
d. Mechanism and Procedure for Settlement of Claims 
To give effect to the need to pay compensation for the claims envisaged 
in Paragraph 16, the Security Council decides to create a fund and a 
Commission that will administer the fund38• The Secretary-General has 
been directed to develop and present to the Security-Council 
recommendations for the fund to meet the requirements for the 
payment of claims and a programme to implement its decisions that 
Iraq fulfill all obligations to make reparation in this regard. 
The Secretary-General submitted his report on May 2, 1991 39, 
containing the requested recommendations. A United Nations Com-
35 See operative Part D. of the Resolution. 
36 See Paragraph 16. 
37 See Paragraph 17. 
38 See Paragraph 18. 
39 UN Document S/22599 (May 2, 1991). 
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pensation Fund is to be created to be administered by a Governing 
Council composed of representatives of the fifteen Members of the 
Security Council in Geneva, Switzerland. The Governing Council 
serves as the appointing authority to nominate members of the 
Commission to administer the fund and to adjudicate the claims. 
Policy decisions would be taken by a majority of no fewer than nine of 
the members of the Council, without any one country having a veto 
power. If consensus is not attainable, questions could be referred to the 
Security Council on the request of any member of the Governing 
Council. 
The report also recommends "mechanisms for determining the 
appropriate level of Iraq' contribution to the fund based on a percentage 
of the value of the exports of petroleum products from Iraq not to 
exceed a figure" as suggested by the Secretary-General, "taking into 
account the requirements of the people of Iraq, Iraq's payment capacity 
as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions 
taking into consideration external debt service, and the needs of the 
Iraqi economy" 40• 
The report recommends arrangements for payments to be made to 
the fund and the process whereby funds will be allocated for satisfaction 
of awards on the claims41 • The report covers claims from various 
parties. The Secretary-General recommends that the injured States file 
claims on their own behalf as well as on behalf of their nationals and 
corporations. Claims concerning individuals could be disposed of 
first 42 • The report suggests that each injured State decide for itself the 
procedures to be followed internally in respect of the consolidation of 
the claims having regard to its own system, practice and procedure43 • 
In line with this suggestion, a number of far-sighted injured States 
have already paved the way for such procedures. In particular, President 
Bush at a Press Conference on January 12, 1991 44 • emphasized, in no 
uncertain terms, that one of the United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions "relates to reparations" and that it was a very important 
part of what the United Nations did. Even prior to that date, the 
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee already introduced 
a bill entitled Iraq claims of 19904\ authorizing the Foreign Claims 
40 This is in keeping with Paragraph 19 of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991). 
41 This is consistent with UNSC Resolution 687 (1991 ), Paragraph 19. 
42 See UN Document S/22559 (May 2, 1991). 
43 Ibid., UN Document S/22559 (May 2, 1991). 
44 The President's News Conference, January 12, 1991, 27 Weekly Comp. 
Pres. Doc. 41 Ganuary 18, 1991). 
45 Congressman Dante B. Fascell introduced an unnumbered bill on 
October 24, 1990, Paragraph 2. 
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Settlement Commission to receive and evaluate "claims against Iraq 
resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait relating either to losses directly 
resulting from Iraq's action or indirectly from steps taken to comply 
with sanctions imposed in compliance with the United Nations. Such 
claims may include compensation for increased security efforts required 
by State and local governments and corporations to counter possible 
terrorist activities in Iraq"46• The Settlement Commission is further 
authorized to pay assistance from Iraqi funds now frozen to the families 
of hostages held in Iraq, such sums as may be necessary to permit 
dependents of such hostage to continue to have funds subject to 
approval by the President. 
Other Western coalition partners have been equally alert in 
anticipating the collation of claims and evidence of injuries suffered 
by their nationals and companies in Kuwait and Iraq. Thus, United 
Kingdom nationals and companies were encouraged to notify the 
losses, damage and injuries suffered47• 
Not unmindful of the danger of simultaneous pursuits of 
overlapping claims before domestic as well as the United Nations 
Claims Commission, the Secretary-General proposes certain guidelines 
to coordinate such claims. According to the procedure adopted, the 
United Nations Secretariat would make a preliminary assessment to 
determine whether the claims meet the requirements established by the 
Governing Council. Panels of three commissioners would conduct 
hearings and render recommendations or awards that are final in 
accordance with the procedures for evaluating losses and verifying their 
validity, subject only to the approval of the Governing Council. With an 
indeterminate amount of claims which in all likelihood will exceed 
available resources, criteria are being established for allocating funds, 
giving some measure of priority to Kuwait as the prime victim of Iraq's 
illegal acts 48 • 
A United Nations Compensation Fund drawing from Iraqi oil 
revenues will thus be created to pay the amounts of claims adjudged and 
46 Ibid., Paragraph 3; see also Paragraph 6 approving efforts of the President 
to seek UN actions to establish an international claims regime. 
47 31 Commonwealth and Foreign Relations pt. 575 (1991 ), 56 Fed. Reg. 
2112 Qanuary 18, 1991). See also Glod, International Claims Arising from Iraq's 
Invasion of Kuwait, 25 The International Lawyer, 713-721 (1991). 
48 As observed by Glod, "the task of sorting out, processing and eventually 
paying war reparations in the aftermath of the Gulf War will indeed involve a 
herculean effort", ibid., 25 The International Lawyer, at p. 721 (1991). Others 
have proposed more drastic measures such as the lifting of foreign sovereign 
immunities, suggested by David Caron in "Iraq and the Force of Law: Why 
Give a Shield of Immunity?" 85 AJIL 89 (1991). 
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awarded to Kuwait and other injured States as well as their citizens and 
corporations. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is directed 
to supervise the establishment of this fund. 
Although liability to pay compensation for the injury suffered is not 
disputed by Iraq, the task of the United Nations extends to the 
enforcement of the awards against Iraq. Parts of Iraqi assets seized or 
frozen outside Iraq will be made available as part of the fund to be 
allocated for payment of compensation, so as to ensure actual 
implementation of the cease-fire agreement in regard to enforcement 
measures and to give effect to the Cease-Fire Resolution specifying 
Iraqi obligation to make reparation for the consequences of its 
internationally wrongful acts. 
In the field of environmental damage in respect of pollution of the 
air, the sea and damage to wildlife and to the earth which has been 
scorched by the burning fire from more than 600 oil wells, Iraq is also 
held responsible, not only to Kuwait and other injured States for the 
loss, injury and damage suffered, but also for the costs of cleaning up 
smokes and pollution in the air by putting out the oil well fires, of 
removing the oil spills in the Persian Gulf and of purifying the soil. The 
United Nations Compensation Fund will also be available for 
satisfaction of this category of claims. 
The task of identifying financial sources to supplement the fund set 
up for this purpose will be monumental. The work of sifting and 
adjudicating the claims presented by various injured parties and victims 
of Iraq's internationally wrongful acts associated with the invasion and 
occupation of Kuwait as well as the landing of scud missiles on several 
injured States will be assigned to an independent body under the 
supervision of the United Nations. The work of the Commission may 
be expected to continue for years and decades to come. 
3. The Final Series of Steps: EX ANTE - To provide satisfaction 
beyond monetary compensation, verbal apologies and unsecured 
assurances, Iraq will be required to give more than oral pledges. The 
United Nations must insist on a firm guarantee that Iraq is committed 
to refrain from certain threats or acts of aggression or other 
internationally wrongful acts of the most serious character. The 
Security Council has assumed its institutional responsibility to make 
sure that humanity will never again suffer from the recurrence of 
nefarious activities by Iraq. 
Based on past experience and upon clear and convincing evidence, 
the Security Council must ensure that Iraq is denied the possibility and 
deprived of the capacity to restage its acts of aggression against Iraq's 
immediate and distant neighbours, and that weapons of mass destruc-
tion such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons must be totally 
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destroyed without foundation to regain production capabilities. The 
Security Council must supervise and monitor the elimination of all 
chemical and biological weapons as well as the total destruction of 
ballistic missile system with a range of more than 95 miles and prevent 
future development or acquisition of such arms or of nuclear arms. 
Iraq's nuclear materials that could be used for the production of 
weapons must be destroyed or removed by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. 
a. Obligations under the Geneva Protocol (1925) and Prohibition of 
Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Part C of the Cease-Fire Resolution "invites Iraq to reaffirm 
unconditionally its obligations under the Geneva Protocol for the 
Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other 
Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, signed at Geneva on 
17 June 1925, and to ratify the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Bio-
logical) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction of 10 April 
1972"49 • The Security Council also decides to impose on Iraq the 
obligation to destroy, remove or render harmless, under international 
superv1s10n 
(i) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and 
all related subsystems and components and all research, development, 
support and manufacturing facilities; 
(ii) All ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 150 kilometres 
and related major parts, and repair and production facilities. 
To this end, Iraq is required to submit a declaration of locations, 
amounts and types of all items and agree to urgent on-site inspection. 
The Secretary-General has developed a plan to accomplish this task in 
consultation with appropriate Governments and with the Director of 
World Health Organization (WH0?0, including 
(i) The forming of a Special Commission to carry out immediate on-
site inspection of Iraq' biological, chemical and missiles capabilities, 
based on Iraq's declarations and designations of additional locations by 
the Special Commission itself; 
(ii) The surrender by Iraq of possession to the Special Commission 
for destruction, removal or rendering harmless, of all chemical and 
49 See Paragraph 7 of UNSC Resolution 687 (1991). 
50 Ibid., Paragraph 9. Iraq is further required (Paragraph 10.) to undertake 
not to use, develop, construct or acquire any of the items above specified subject 
to on-going monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with this 
obligation. 
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biological weapons, etc., and the destruction by Iraq under the 
supervision of the Special Commission of all missiles capabilities, etc.; 
(iii) The provision by the Special Commission of the assistance and 
cooperation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 
regard to Iraq's obligations under (b) below. 
b. Obligation under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (1968) 
Iraq is also invited to reaffirm unconditionally its obligations under the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty of July 1, 196851 • In 
particular, Iraq shall unconditionally agree not to acquire or develop 
nuclear weapons or nuclear-weapons-usable materials or any sub-
systems or components or any research, development, support or 
manufacturing facilities related to the above52• 
For this purpose, the Specialized Agency concerned is the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose Director General 
and the Secretary-General of the United Nations will receive from Iraq 
a declaration of the locations, amounts and types of all items so 
specified, which will be placed under the exclusive control for custody 
and removal of the IAEA with the assistance of the Special Commis-
sion. Iraq is further required to accept urgent on-site inspection and the 
destruction, removal and rendering harmless, as appropriate, of all items 
related to nuclear weapons or usable materials for future on-going 
monitoring and verification of Iraq's compliance with these 
undertakings53 • However, due to Iraq's reluctance to accept unconditio-
nally most of these undertakings, monitoring and verification by the 
IAEA Inspection Team have encountered some major obstacles. During 
the week of September 23-27, 1991, an Inspection Team of 44 members 
were detained in the parking lot of a nuclear facility, due to the 
reluctance of Iraqi personnel to surrender items related to the 
production of nuclear weapons. A compromise was not achieved until 
the Inspection Team agreed to draw up an inventory of the items 
removed 54• 
Avowedly, denuclearization represents a step towards the goal of 
establishing in the Middle East a zone free from weapons of mass 
destruction and all missiles for their delivery and towards the object of a 
global ban on chemical weapons55• 
51 Ibid., Paragraph 11. 
52 These are obligations required by Paragraph 12. of UNSC Resolution 
687 &1991) 
5 Ibid., Paragraph 13. 
54 CNN. T.V. News Coverage, September 23-27, 1991. 
55 See Paragraph 14 of the UNSC Resolution 687 (1991). 
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c. Prohibition of Sale of Arms and Material 
Security Council Resolution 661 (1990) 56 establishing a Security 
Council Committee will continue in force until further notice. The 
Cease-Fire Resolution57 requires continuing prohibition of all sales or 
supplies to Iraq by nationals of all States or from their territories or 
using their flag vessels or aircraft of 
(i) Arms and related materiel of all types, including specifically all 
forms of conventional military equipment, for paramilitary forces, and 
spare parts and components and the means of production for such 
equipment; 
(ii) Items identified as chemical and biological weapons as well as 
nuclear weapons and usable materials; 
(iii) Technology under licensing or other transfer arrangements, 
used for the production, utilization or stockpiling of items specified in 
(i) and (ii); 
(iv) Personnel and materials for training and technical support 
services relating to the design, development, manufacture, use, 
maintenance or support of the above items. 
In other words, a total ban of all sales of any material or technology 
which could conceivably enhance Iraq's war-making capabilities. States 
and international organizations are called upon to observe this 
prohibition, "notwithstanding the existence of any contracts, agree-
ments, licenses or any other arrangements" 58 • 
d. Easing of Prohibition against the Sale or Supply of Commodities or 
Products other than Medicine or Health Supplies 
The general ban on the sale or supply of commodities or products other 
than medicine and health supplies as contained in Security Council 
Resolution 661 (1990) including prohibitions against financial transac-
tions related thereto shall cease immediately with regard to "foodstuffs 
notified to the Security Council Committee" or with the approval of 
that Committee, "under the simplified and accelerated 'no objection' 
procedure, to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as 
identified in the report of the Secretary-General dated 20 March 1991, 
and in any further findings of humanitarian need by the Committee" 59 • 
Such prohibitions as continue to apply are subject to periodic 
review for further reduction or lifting60• As and when Iraq has 
56 August 6, 1990, 29 ILM 1325 (1990). 
57 UNSC Resolution 687 (1991 ), Paragraph 24. 
58 Ibid., Paragraph 25. 
59 Paragraph 20 of the UNSC Resolution 687 (1991). 
60 Ibid., Paragraph 21. 
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completed all actions contemplated in connection with biological and 
nuclear weapons, prohibitions against import of commodities and 
products originating in Iraq and against financial transactions related 
thereto shall have no further force and effect61 • The Security Council 
Committee is further empowered to approve, when required to assure 
adequate financial resources on the part of Iraq to carry out the 
purchase or acquisitions of foodstuffs, materials and supplies for 
essential civilian needs, exempted from the prohibition against the 
import of commodities and products originating in Iraq. Thus, on 
August 15, 1991, the Security Council allowed Iraq to sell US$ 1.6 
billion worth of crude oil to be used exclusively for the purchase of 
foodstuffs and other essential civilian needs for the survival of Iraq's 
populace for the following six months' period. Iraq has complained that 
it has lost US$ 17 billion as the result of the continuing ban on import 
and export. 
e. Obligation not to Support International Terrorism 
As noted earlier, Iraq is also required to undertake not to support any 
act of international terrorism and to renounce all acts, methods and 
practices of terrorism62• 
In addition, Iraq must give the fullest satisfaction to the whole 
world by declaring that Iraq will not "commit or support" international 
terrorism or allow any terrorist group to operate from its territory. This 
restraint is consistent with the conduct of peace-loving States and 
constitutes a minimum standard of good-neighbourliness. 
The measures thus outlined in the form of obligations ex ante on the 
part of Iraq are indispensable to the peace and security of mankind in 
the region. They constitute minimal precautionary steps to prevent the 
recurrence of further injurious consequences to neighbouring States and 
the environment which constitutes the common heritage of mankind. 
IV. Conclusion 
The United Nations have come a long way since its inception in San 
Francisco. It should be observed with a sense of guarded optimism that 
for once, and not by accident, the principal organ of the United Nations 
primarily responsible for the maintenance of international peace and 
security has been able to perform its functions as efficiently as could be 
expected. For once the Organization is able and willing to fulfill its 
primary aims and purposes. 
61 Ibid., Paragraph 22. 
62 See texts note 25 above and Paragraph 32 of the Cease-Fire Resolution. 
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The requirement of periodic review of the status of compliance with 
the cease-fire conditions by Iraq under the supervision of the Security 
Council and monitored by the United Nations peace-keeping opera-
tions, including the various observation missions, units, teams and 
guard contingents, will in fact enable the United Nations eventually to 
lift most if not all of the economic and other sanctions imposed on Iraq 
commensurate with the progress and complete satisfaction qf 
compliance with each of the terms and conditions of the cease-fire 
agreement. Slowly but surely, after convalescence and rehabilitation, 
Iraq will be able to rejoin the peaceful community of nations of which it 
once used to form part. 
The World Organization, like any other international bodies, can 
only be as strong and as effective as its members are willing to allow it 
to be. In this particular connection, it is the will of the five permanent 
members of the Security Council occupying the crucial and critical 
position that is determinative of its strength and destiny. If only one of 
the five should fail to play its responsible role, the whole mechanism of 
the Organization is paralyzed. 
Having come this far, the United Nations should be able to maintain 
a steady and consistent course in the role it has learned to play with 
patience and in good conscience to safeguard international peace and 
security as well as to uphold human rights and dignity in a safe, sane, 
viable and livable human environment. 
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